



# FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

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## AMERICANS SHOW CONCERN OVER CONDITIONS IN CHINA

ALTHOUGH the objectives of Japan's current drives in North and Central China are still unclear, these moves, breaking a military lull which has existed since last December, demonstrate anew that the initiative on the China land front remains in Japanese hands. The inactivity of the Chungking forces, which confine themselves to meeting enemy attacks, arises from many long-standing economic and political difficulties. Chief of these is the extreme shortage of supplies, a result of the stringent Japanese blockade, the higher priority of other Allied war areas, and China's low level of industrial production. But additional items must be entered in the ledger, including the ever-soaring inflation (due to hoarding and speculation, as well as lack of commodities), Kuomintang-Communist political differences which keep valuable troops away from the front, and the effects on Chinese morale of fighting for almost seven years, with the end not in sight.

**AMERICAN CRITICISM.** America's interest under these conditions in strengthening its solidarity with China is suggested by the decision to send Vice-President Wallace to Chungking in the near future. This trip is of more than domestic significance, for Mr. Wallace, as an old friend of China and the second highest official in the United States, can serve a useful purpose in improving Chinese-American relations. Certainly there is no obscuring the fact that American commentators have in the past year become increasingly critical of conditions in China, reflecting in some respects views held in official circles in Washington. These complaints have dealt not only with specific questions of Chinese-American war cooperation, but also with the direction taken by China's internal political development.

The adjustment, for example, of the United States armed forces in China to conditions prevailing there has led in some cases to friction and disillusionment. Soldiers and officers have resented the high prices

paid until recently by the United States Army as a result of the unsatisfactory exchange rate between Chinese and American dollars. In general our men have been unprepared for the contrast between the bare realities of a nation battered by protracted war and the romantic conceptions of Chinese life that are still widespread in this country. They have been affected also by what they have seen or heard of corruption and other undesirable practices of Chinese civilian and army officials, and they have found it difficult to accept a level of efficiency far below that to which they are accustomed at home.

**TOWARD DEMOCRACY?** American and other foreign newspapermen have been angered by the exceptionally severe Chungking censorship which seldom allows them to serve their readers more than the bare bones of the news and sometimes suppresses non-security information of considerable importance. But the bulk of unfavorable comment has been concerned with Chinese politics, especially the sharp Kuomintang-Communist differences, which expressed themselves in a decade of internal strife before anti-Japanese resistance began in 1937 and could, it is feared, result in renewed civil war at a later date. The feeling has developed in the United States—and also in Britain—that Chungking has contributed greatly to internal friction by establishing rigid controls over Chinese political opinion and activity. Particularly disturbing was the announcement by the Chinese Ministry of Education that persons going abroad as students would first have to attend a school run by the Kuomintang, the official political party, and, after arriving in the United States and Britain, submit to supervision in thought and conduct by Chinese officials stationed there.

Chungking has reacted to American criticism by expressing its official resentment, carrying through or hinting at certain modifications of policy, and making some criticisms of its own. On the positive side,

the problem of American Army purchases has been adjusted, and there have been suggestions that censorship on foreign dispatches may be eased. At the same time, the Allies have been reminded that Chinese resistance is essential to the defeat of Japan and that, in the words of a government spokesman, "except for China's fighting in the initial stages of this great war, the world today would present a different picture and history a different page."

On the other hand, at least one high Chinese official has urged that Chungking regard foreign criticism realistically and draw important lessons from it. Thus, in a recent speech, Sun Fo, son of Sun Yat-sen and president of the Legislative Yuan, spoke in extremely sharp terms of China's slow political progress and pointed to the fact that, after sixteen years of rule by the Kuomintang, "there is not one member of a county council nor one county administrator who has been elected to office by the people of the country." He also noted with alarm that "if in the post-war era our Allies should be convinced that with the domination of the Kuomintang China would not become a fully democratic state but would become, in fact, a fascist and aggressive state, they might take steps to protect themselves from future possibilities and might refuse to cooperate with us. In such a case we would be isolated."

WHAT IS AMERICA'S INTEREST? The degree

## GREEK CRISIS FINDS RUSSIA AND BRITAIN AT ODDS

From behind the veil of Allied censorship that obscures the recent mutiny in the First Greek Brigade in the Middle East and the somewhat smaller naval revolt in Alexandria, signs indicate that the Greek political crisis, which began virtually on the day King George's régime went into exile three years ago, is reaching its climax. In this crisis the central issue is whether the large leftist resistance groups—EAM (the Greek National Liberation Front) and the left-wing of a more moderate organization, EKKA—should be represented in the government-in-exile. Since these underground organizations are outspokenly republican, King George's supporters, as well as the émigrés who believe the constitutional question should be postponed until Greece is free, oppose their inclusion in the cabinet. EAM has also incurred the displeasure of the government-in-exile because, although the majority of its members are liberals and leftists, some of its leaders are Communists.

Last autumn it seemed that the differences between EAM and the government-in-exile might be fought out in enemy-occupied Greece, for an armed clash occurred between guerrillas of the Liberation Front and members of EDES, a more conservative underground organization that is inclined to cooperate with the royalists. This encounter, it now appears,

to which the United States should interest itself in the internal affairs of other states is a central problem of foreign policy, affecting the whole range of our relations abroad. The question is in no sense peculiar to China, but Sun Fo has put his finger on a crucial point by indicating that the self-interest of China's allies is deeply affected by the way in which China's domestic politics influences its rôle abroad.

The issue is not whether the United States has the right to dictate to China—for it has no such right—but whether China, as well as other nations, will follow internal policies that facilitate international cooperation. Fortunately, at the present moment strong sentiments of mutual friendship exist between the Chinese and American peoples, but it is to be hoped that this friendship will not be exposed to future strain. If China, after the defeat of Japan, should be split by civil war, the result would be to complicate China's foreign relations, especially with Russia, to prevent China from playing the important role in Far Eastern affairs that Americans would like to see it assume, and to shatter for the time being American hopes for the development of the China market. Inevitably, in view of the seriousness of all these developments, the United States is obliged to examine closely any tendencies in such a direction and to determine its policies accordingly.

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

resulted from a German-inspired misunderstanding and, instead of leading to civil war, was followed by agreement to cooperate.

WHAT THE QUARREL IS ABOUT. But efforts of the leftist resistance movements in Greece to win a place in the government-in-exile have been less successful. The main stumbling-block in the path of unity has been the question of the monarchy. EAM insists it cannot trust the King in view of the dictatorship he established in pre-war Greece, and demands a promise that a plebiscite on the form of Greece's government shall be held before, rather than after, the ruler's return to the country. Although the government-in-exile has consistently refused this demand, the opposing underground groups have not slackened their efforts. In an effort to increase their bargaining power with the government, representatives of EAM and EKKA formed a Committee of Five early this spring, and proclaimed their right to a position in the exiled cabinet as spokesmen for a widespread resistance movement. Although this claim did not find a sympathetic response in official circles, it won the approval of some members of the Greek armed forces in exile who share EAM's republicanism and feel dissatisfied with the government. On March 31 a group of officers holding these views called on Prime Minister Tsouderos and re-

quested his resignation and the creation of a new cabinet including representatives of the Committee of Five. In reply, the Premier arrested the delegation and this move—instead of curbing disaffection in the armed forces—precipitated army and navy mutinies that lasted nearly three weeks and had to be put down by force.

Faced by this evidence of lack of confidence in the government-in-exile, Prime Minister Tsouderos—who had held office since the eve of Greece's defeat in 1941—resigned on April 3. His successor, Sophocles Venizelos, son of the famous pro-Allied leader in World War I and a republican who temporarily accepts King George as a trustee of Greek national sovereignty in exile, spent a fortnight in fruitless attempts to form a new government. After his resignation the king named George Papandreou as Premier. Papandreou, who only recently escaped from a Nazi prison camp in Greece, was apparently appointed because he combines a record as a well-known liberal leader with disapproval of the Committee of Five.

**BRITAIN'S POSITION.** The Greek political crisis is important to the United Nations because continued disorders among Greek army and naval forces might impair Allied military plans. Equally important are the long-range implications of Greek developments for future relations between the U.S.S.R. and Britain. Until recently it seemed to many observers of Balkan affairs that Moscow and London had made some kind of deal whereby Russia, in return for British agreement to support the Yugoslav Partisans, was pursuing a hands-off policy in Greece.

But there has been some doubt as to the line British policy in Greece was following. The British army tended to support all guerrilla groups inside Greece because of their military value. The Foreign Office, however, attempted to discourage the Liberation Front—presumably because of Churchill's promise to restore King George, and Britain's fear that EAM's inclusion of Communists might predispose it to a pro-Russian policy. Churchill's displeasure with

the leftist guerrilla groups in Greece was expressed in his report to Parliament on February 22, when he described the Greek situation as "the saddest case of all" and painted a picture of confusion and interne-cine strife. Any remaining doubts concerning Britain's disapproval of EAM'S effort to change the Greek government now were dispelled on April 29 when Churchill sent a message to Premier Papandreou insisting that Greece's political differences must be set aside until after the war and promising the Greek people freedom in choosing their form of post-war government.

**MOSCOW'S NEW POLICY.** Meanwhile, South Africa's Premier, Jan Christiaan Smuts, and other Empire statesmen are reported to fear that while Britain attempts to suspend Greek political problems until after the nation is liberated, Moscow may draw up a more positive program for Greece. And, in fact, there are indications that Russia may be abandoning its neutrality and giving support to the leftist Greek groups that have failed to win London's approval. The first step in this direction was taken at the end of January, when an article in *War and the Working Class* castigated the Greek government-in-exile for advocating passive resistance in Greece and praised EAM for its guerrilla warfare. On March 21, a Soviet analyst in *Red Star* reiterated this approval of the Liberation Front and declared "all Greek patriots" had rallied to its leadership. Accordingly, the Soviet press and radio later launched an attack on Premier Tsouderos' government, declaring it rested on the support of pro-Fascist elements among Greek army officers.

Behind the apparent shift in Soviet policy may be both immediate and long-range considerations. One is undoubtedly Moscow's eagerness to insure the Greeks' maximum participation in the war during the decisive months ahead by making their government-in-exile inclusive of all political groups. Another may be Russia's desire to bid for a friendly post-war Greek régime—resting on the assumption that the present leftist guerrilla groups will play an important role in the future of Greece. What appears on the surface to be merely a Greek political crisis, therefore, could become part of a dangerous contest between Britain and Russia for spheres of influence in the eastern Mediterranean. On the other hand, continued close military cooperation between these great powers can do much to prevent friction between them in Greece and other areas of tension.

WINIFRED N. HADSEL

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### **ARGENTINA IN CRISIS**

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
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# Washington News Letter



MAY 1.—On January 31, 1920, when memory of the Senate's rejection of the Versailles Treaty was still fresh, Viscount Grey, former British Foreign Secretary, wrote to the London *Times* that the Constitution of the United States "renders inevitable conflict between the Executive and the Legislature." Having experienced that conflict for eleven years as Secretary of State, Cordell Hull has now set out to make a team of executive and legislature as far as foreign affairs are concerned, so that Congress will accept at this war's end the treaty arrangements the President makes. On the success of this experiment may depend the course which the United States will follow in world affairs in the coming era of peace.

**STATE DEPARTMENT PLANS TO COOPERATE WITH CONGRESS.** Division between Congress and the State Department is traditional. Secretary of State John Hay said that a treaty "entering the Senate is like a bull going into the arena; no one can say just how or when the final blow will fall, but one thing is certain—it will never leave the arena alive." During his first year in the State Department, Mr. Hull proposed that Congress enact legislation authorizing the President to forbid American exports of arms to the aggressor state in a war. Instead, Congress passed a bill prohibiting exports of arms to any belligerent. President Roosevelt and Mr. Hull vainly urged the Congress in May and June of 1939 to revise the Neutrality Act, whose provisions were helpful to a Germany planning war. Although in domestic affairs Congress held a subordinate position from 1933 to 1940, it effectively controlled American foreign policy during the Roosevelt Administration until events like the surrender of France revealed the emptiness of Congressional debate.

Chairman Tom Connally of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee declared on March 24 that Secretary Hull had proposed the organization of a Senate committee to discuss post-war international plans with him. On April 25 the committee held its first meeting with Mr. Hull, and the Secretary intends to meet with the Senators regularly. The committee is composed of four Democrats—Senators Connally, Walter George of Georgia, Alben W. Barkley of Kentucky, and Guy M. Gillette of Iowa; three Republicans—Arthur H. Vandenberg of Michigan, Wallace H. White, Jr., of Maine, and Warren R. Austin of Vermont; and one Progressive, Robert M. LaFollette, Jr., of Wisconsin.

Congress has also been invited to participate,

through selected members of the House and Senate, in decisions affecting subsidiary foreign policy questions. For instance, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., frequently consulted the House and Senate Banking Committee during the preliminary negotiations on world monetary stabilization; these talks will bear fruit in the coming monetary conference announced on April 21. In the petroleum conversations with Britain, now in progress in Washington, the Administration takes into consideration the views of the special oil committee, whose chairman is Senator Francis Maloney, Democrat, of Connecticut. The State Department also has established liaison with Congress on international aviation questions.

**ENCOURAGING TO UNITED NATIONS.** The leaders of Allied governments, realizing that Congress has the power to dictate the terms on which this country will accept a peace settlement, naturally hope that Mr. Hull will be able to guide the Senate conferees into advocacy of a policy of forceful international collaboration. For practical purposes, it is important that Mr. Hull convince Republicans as well as Democrats. Indeed, the Secretary of State maintains that the major parties should agree on foreign policy and thereby bury it as an issue during the forthcoming Presidential campaign. The April 27 speech of Governor Dewey of New York and the address delivered two days before by Ohio's Governor Bricker suggest that, although there will be criticism of the Administration's conduct of foreign policy, there may be broad agreement on principle.

On April 12 Mr. Hull told Speaker Sam Rayburn of the House of Representatives that he also intended to confer with House members on the development of the Administration's foreign policy. He began working with the Senate rather than the House because the Constitution provides that the Senate alone can ratify treaties by a two-thirds majority vote. Representative Chester E. Merrow of New Hampshire proposed on April 22 the submission of a constitutional amendment to the people calling for treaty ratification by simple majority of both houses. But the prospect of change is slight. The Senate is jealous of its authority, and Senator Connally on April 23 said that the two-thirds rule was essential to stable foreign policy and he would fight all attempts to abolish it.

BLAIR BOLLES

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